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Abstract  
Since 2008, many have questioned the efficacy of conventional homeownership, particularly for 
low-income households. Advocates champion shared equity homeownership as an alternative, 
including community land trusts (CLTs) and limited equity cooperatives (LECs); yet, they too 
have limitations. CLTs offer ongoing homeownership support, but require conventionally 
“bankable” households. LECs can offer low-income households autonomy and limited asset 
building, but often require fiscal and organizational support to succeed. This paper explores an 
innovation in shared equity—the merger of CLTs and LECs to address challenges and maximize 
collective strengths. Set within the context of the benefits and limits of CLTs and LECs as 
independent organizations, the paper examines five CLTs with LEC projects. It considers the 
CLTs’ motivations for pursuing LECs and appraises the characteristics of hybrid projects. While 
CLT-LEC projects are small in number, they illustrate an emergent practice in the field and 
speak to the organizational adaptability of the broader shared equity model. 
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Community Land Trusts And Limited Equity Cooperatives: 





Homeownership has been a cornerstone of US housing policy since the Great Depression (Shlay 
2006). Its normative value is steeped in visions of white picket fences and manicured lawns. An 
economic preference for homeownership over other tenure types is embedded in the federal 
budget: In 2008, direct federal expenditures targeted $40.2 billion towards low-income renters, 
reaching seven million households; in contrast, 155 million homeowners qualified for 
homeownership entitlements, including mortgage tax deductions, that exceeded $171 billion 
(Schwartz 2010). 
 
Despite a housing policy bias towards homeownership, some are actively challenging the status 
quo (Davis 2012; Li and Yang 2010; Saegert, Fields, and Libman 2009). For these scholars and 
advocates, homeownership does not represent a goal unto itself. There is simply insufficient 
evidence that its benefits (and risks) are uniformly extended to the most vulnerable households. 
Yet, even in the wake of the Great Recession, the economic argument for homeownership 
remains strong, with homeowners claiming significantly more wealth than renters (Boehm and 
Schlottmann 2008). Some argue that rather than perpetuating homeownership as a singular 
benefit, housing policy must separate sustainable homeownership from the more risky forms that 
exacerbated the foreclosure crisis (Wyly 2013; Santiago et al. 2010; Calem, Wachter, and 
Courchane 2009). 
 
Shared equity models represent one sustainable alternative to conventional homeownership; they 
include community land trusts (CLTs) and limited equity cooperatives (LECs). At their core, 
shared equity models are defined as follows: resale-restricted, owner-occupied housing where the 
“bundle” of property rights is divided between the homeowner and the community. The 
subdivision of building and land rights allows households to access affordable ownership 
opportunities and enables the community—via a non-profit steward—to retain a stake in the 
land, maintaining permanent affordability and mitigating speculative market forces.  
 
In a CLT, a household retains ownership of its dwelling unit—typically a single-family home, 
while the CLT, as a non-profit organization, retains title to the underlying land. A ground lease 
connects the homeowner to the CLT and is used to enforce the shared equity affordability 
controls. The constant presence of a non-profit steward provides support at all phases of 
homeownership, including access to pre-purchase education and non-predatory financing 
options, ongoing maintenance training, and pre-foreclosure counseling to help homeowners 
avoid defaulting on their loans. Yet, while CLTs can provide stability and access to affordable 
homeownership, they often require households to qualify for conventional loans, which can 
exclude segments of the low-income population. 
 
In an LEC, several households collectively own multiple dwelling units—usually in a multi-
family building—via a cooperative corporation (co-op). Each household purchases one share of 
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the co-op, entitling them to a dwelling unit and a vote in the co-op’s governance; the share also 
enforces the co-op’s limited equity (i.e., affordability) controls. Low-income tenants often pursue 
this model of ownership when their landlords threaten them with eviction and/or building 
disrepair. An LEC provides a means for low and very low-income households to gain autonomy 
over their housing circumstances, preserve affordable rents, and earn very modest equity. It also, 
however, requires a significant amount of fiscal and organizational capacity to maintain the co-
op; many LECs risk dissolution over the long term. 
 
This paper explores an innovation in the shared equity field: The merger of CLTs with LECs to 
respond to their individual challenges and leverage their strengths. The research draws from case 
studies of five CLTs, representing fifteen LECs, across the US and asks: are emergent CLT-LEC 
projects able to fill the gaps left by CLTs or LECs alone? It considers the motivations for a CLT 
to pursue an LEC (or vice versa) and appraises the characteristics of hybrid projects. While the 
number of CLT-LEC projects is limited, the cases illustrate an emergent practice in the field and 
speak to the organizational adaptability of the broader shared equity model. 
 
While the research assesses the organizational framework of CLT-LEC partnerships, the subject 
is rooted in homeownership, broadly, and shared equity homeownership, specifically. The paper 
begins with a review of debates surrounding low-income homeownership. Subsequently, it 
delves into shared equity homeownership as an alternative; this includes in-depth discussions of 
the CLT and LEC models, including their independent strengths and weaknesses. These sections 
provide the basis for exploring CLT-LEC partnerships through comparative case studies.  
 
Data and Limitations  
 
There are more than 250 CLTs in the US; to date, only a handful of these organizations have 
elected to include LECs in their portfolios. There is no comprehensive listing of CLT-LEC 
partnerships, but the researcher identified fewer than ten CLTs with active LEC projects in their 
portfolios or in pursuit of LEC projects. One explanation for the limited reach of shared equity 
models overall, as well as the emergent CLT-LEC model discussed in this paper, is their lack of 
familiarity to developers, elected officials and municipal departments, and homeowners. The 
subdivision of property rights between an individual and the community, represented by a non-
profit steward, does not reflect the conventional approach to property. Despite its adaptability to 
existing financial and property regulations, shared equity homeownership is fundamentally based 
on a non-market ideology. For some, the novelty of shared equity models makes them appear 
risky; others perceive their non-speculative tenets as subversive. Further, as non-profits 
dedicated to stewarding perpetually affordable housing, there are often fiscal constraints that 
limit the scale and scope of shared equity portfolios. 
 
This study used a snowball sampling method to identify CLTs with LEC projects in their 
portfolios. The researcher identified eight potential CLT-LEC projects and, upon further 
examination, selected five established CLT-LEC partnerships for the study. Each case examined 
the circumstances and motivations that led a CLT to pursue a CLT-LEC merger, as well as the 
physical, fiscal, and organizational characteristics of the projects (Table 1). Collectively, the 
CLTs represented fifteen LEC projects comprised of nearly 600 dwelling units.  
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Table 1. CLTs and affiliated LEC projects included in the study 
CLT LEC Project Type Number of Units 
Lopez CLT 
Lopez Island, WA 
Morgantown Coop New Construction, Single-family LEC 7 
Coho Coop New Construction, Single-family LEC 7 
Innisfree Coop New Construction, Single-family LEC 8 
Common Ground Coop New Construction, Single-family LEC 11 
Tierra Verde New Construction, Single-family LEC 4 
San Francisco CLT 
San Francisco, CA 
Columbus United Cooperative Rehabilitation, Multi-family LEC 21 
Purple House Cooperative Rehabilitation, Multi-family co-housing LEC 10 
Northern California CLT 
San Francisco, CA 
Addison Courts Rehabilitation, Multi-family LEC 10 
Fairview House Rehabilitation, Multi-family co-housing LEC 9 
Champlain Housing Trust 
Burlington, VT 
Flynn Avenue Cooperative Homes New Construction, Multi-family LEC 28 
House of Hildegard Cooperative Rehabilitation, Multi-family LEC 3 
Thelma Maple Cooperative New Construction, Multi-family LEC 20 
Queensbury Cooperative New Construction, Duplex LEC 18 
Rose Street Artists’ Cooperative Rehabilitation, Multi-family LEC 12 
Cooper Square Mutual 
Housing Association 
New York, NY 
Cooper Square Mutual Housing 
Association 
Rehabilitation, Scatter-site multi-
family LEC (21 buildings) 328 
 
To explore CLT-LEC partnerships, the study engaged CLT executive directors and staff. The 
case studies focused exclusively on the organizational framework of CLT-LEC projects; they did 
not include the perspectives of LEC board members or shareholders, nor did they extend to the 
experience of individual households within a CLT-LEC project. They examined the framework 
at all phases: conceptual development and feasibility assessment; financing, construction, and 
incorporation; and long-term maintenance and stewardship. 
 
CLT representatives participated in two ways. First, they responded to an online survey about the 
CLT and its portfolio. In addition to situating LECs within the total asset holdings of the CLT, it 
also contributed to a physical and financial profile of each co-op. Subsequently, CLT 
representatives completed a 60-minute, semi-structured phone interview. The interviews 
expanded the LEC profiles and explored the formal and informal dynamics between CLTs and 
LECs.  
 
The case studies illustrate the physical diversity of LEC projects across each of the CLTs, as well 
as the range of circumstances that led a CLT to innovate with LECs. In each instance, the 
physical shape of LECs was heavily influenced by its regional context and the corresponding 
housing demands. Yet, beyond their physical characteristics, the five case studies show 
consistency within each CLT, as well as across CLTs, with respect to the adaptation of shared 
equity principles and the organizational exchange between a CLT “manager” and its LEC 
project. 
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Homeownership: One Size Fits All Solution? 
 
For decades, homeownership has been characterized as a black and white, “one-size-fits-all” 
solution. Regardless of a household’s economic circumstance, policymakers championed 
homeownership as an important means of building wealth and the only way up the socio-
economic ladder (Shlay 2006). While there is some truth in this statement, the literature is much 
more nuanced. 
 
From an economic standpoint, scholars generally agree that homeownership is the most 
prominent means of building wealth in the US; the accumulation of housing wealth is greater 
than non-housing wealth (e.g., stocks, savings) for the majority of households (Boehm and 
Schlottmann 2008). As an asset class, housing is unique—a household benefits from its 
economic value (i.e. a financial investment) and its use value (i.e. a physical home) (Levitin and 
Wachter 2013). This feature makes homeownership particularly attractive and potentially more 
accessible as an investment for households with limited disposable incomes. 
 
A variety of studies explore the wealth gap between homeowners and renters, finding substantial 
differences (Herbert and Belsky 2006; Shlay 2006; Reid 2004; Denton 2001). Kennickell et al. 
(1999) found 55% of a household’s total net worth was tied to their primary residence, netting 
homeowners a median worth of $132,000; by comparison, renters claimed $45,000. The Joint 
Center for Housing Studies (2013) reported a greater gap: the median net worth of homeowners 
was $173,010 in 2010, substantially exceeding renters at $5,100. Grinstein-Weiss et al. (2013) 
studied wealth building for a subset of low-income households, finding that homeowners 
possessed a total net worth $10,500 greater than renters between 2005 and 2008. 
 
The economic benefit of homeownership, however, is not simple. Low-income households are 
often exposed to substantially greater risk and are less likely to reap the rewards of 
homeownership relative to their higher income counterparts. For instance, low-income 
homeownership is described as “forced savings,” directing resources that previously went 
towards rent into an equity repository (Davis 2010b; Shlay 2006). While direct investment in 
equity may be positive, the literature suggests low-income homebuyers generally realize less 
appreciation than higher income households, dedicate a greater percentage of their income 
towards mortgage payments (and away from potential investment vehicles, such as 401Ks or 
mutual funds), and are more likely to depend on high-risk financing, which increases their 
exposure to foreclosure (Jacobus and Davis 2010; Jacobus 2007; Herbert and Belsky 2006).  
 
The timing and location of homeownership also pose a substantial risk for low-income 
households (Davis 2010b; Herbert and Belsky 2006; Shlay 2006). Low-income homeowners are 
more likely to purchase lower quality units in less desirable neighborhoods, exposing their 
investment to neighborhood instability, limited appreciation (or depreciation), and increased 
maintenance costs. Limited resources may constraint a low-income household’s ability to 
capitalize on the resale of their investment. Without the means to sustain homeownership until 
the market is right (i.e., a “seller’s” market), many low-income homeowners dispense of their 
properties at a loss or a minimal gain that cannot cover the transaction costs (Herbert and Belsky 
2006; Belsky and Duda 2002). Under these conditions, the adage of homeownership as a secure 
investment is, in reality, much less certain. 
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The recent housing crisis has caused many scholars, policymakers, and consumers to question 
the tenets of homeownership and, more specifically, its soundness for low-income households 
(Stein 2010). Others view the crisis as an impetus for change and opportunity to reconsider the 
mechanics of affordable housing (Belsky 2013; Davis 2010b). Many scholars in the latter group 
conclude that homeownership can offer meaningful benefits, particularly to low-income 
households traditionally excluded from conventional markets and other forms of wealth 
accumulation (Jacobus and Abromowitz 2010; Jacobus and Davis 2010; Temkin, Theodos, and 
Price 2010; Jacobus 2007). From this perspective, the question is not about the merits of 
ownership at large. Instead, it is about pursuing sustainable homeownership, which supports 
wealth-building opportunities at an affordable price and devoid of excessive—or, in the case of 
predatory loans, exotic—risks that favor the investor over the consumer. 
 
 
Shared Equity Homeownership: A Better Model? 
 
Shared equity homeownership offers a viable alternative to the traditional own or rent choice. 
Prime examples of sustainable homeownership, shared equity models provide the stability and 
wealth building benefits of ownership, while preserving affordable housing on behalf of the 
community (Koschinsky 1998). The models are rooted in the early 20th century ideology of 
Henry George (1879) and John Stuart Mill (1900). The term, however, emerged only recently, 
solidifying general principles into a flexible framework. 
 
Conceptually, shared equity homeownership separates the “bundle of rights” typically associated 
with property ownership and reassigns them to different parties. The reallocation of rights seeks 
to move beyond the traditional landlord-tenant relationship and neutralize real estate’s inherent 
price speculation. Shared equity models subdivide property ownership into a “use” right, where 
the homeowner retains ownership of physical improvements on a property (e.g., the house), and 
a “land” right, where a non-profit organization retains ownership of the underlying land (Davis 
2010b; Davis 2006). Classic examples of shared equity models include CLTs, LECs, and price-
restricted houses or condominiums with permanent affordability covenants (Davis 2010a). 
 
At its core, all shared equity models are characterized by two principles (Temkin, Theodos, and 
Price 2010; Davis 2006). First, permanent affordability ensures homes remain affordable in 
perpetuity through subsidy retention techniques, such as resale formulas that limit the 
appreciation a homeowner may claim on his/her investment. Second, long-term stewardship 
focuses on the preservation of an affordable resource, by a non-profit and for the community, 
through active stewardship of the land itself.  
 
These two hallmarks distinguish shared equity properties from other common forms of 
ownership with communal elements. For instance, in a condominium project, each household 
retains full ownership of its dwelling unit and joint ownership of common areas; in principle, the 
condominium could also be a shared equity project, but not without permanent affordability 
controls that restrict the unit’s resale value. In contrast, some neighborhoods have homeowner 
associations (HOAs)—non-profits responsible for the maintenance of common areas and overall 
neighborhood conditions. While individual households are required to make financial 
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contributions to the HOA and, by extension, common spaces, they possess distinct ownership of 
their parcel of land and dwelling unit and are free from price restrictions. 
 
Despite the strides shared equity programs make in addressing the risks of low-income 
homeownership, their strengths are met by criticism over their methods. Stein (2010) concisely 
describes the issue when she states “[t]he resale formula is the fulcrum of the tension between 
durable affordability and individual wealth creation.” Critics contend that because shared equity 
models prevent homeowners from realizing the full amount of appreciation, they are hampering 
the asset-building opportunities for low-income households (Davis 2010b; Jacobus and Davis 
2010; Stein 2010; Jacobus 2007).  
 
Yet, while these models diverge from traditional real estate ideology, the evidence suggests 
shared equity homeownership produces a reliable return to low-income homeowners. An 
evaluation of the Champlain Housing Trust in Burlington, VT found CLT homeowners’ 
investments appreciated by approximately 25% (Jacobus and Davis 2010)—less than 
conventional owners (53%), but more than if they remained renters. The Urban Institute study 
arrived at similar conclusions, calculating internal rates of return between 6.5% and 59.6% for 
shared equity households in their study (Temkin, Theodos, and Price 2010). For all but one CLT 
in their study, the homeowner’s rate of return exceeded what the household would have earned 
had they invested their down payment in an S&P 500 index fund or a 10-year Treasury Bond. 
 
Community Land Trusts 
 
Dating to the 1960s, CLTs are one of the most prominent, and flexible, examples of shared 
equity homeownership. The hallmarks of CLTs include: 
 
• The CLT, a non-profit organization, owns the land. This land is “rented” to a homeowner 
via a long-term (e.g., 99-year), renewable ground lease, transferrable to the homeowner’s 
heirs. 
 
• CLT residents own their homes, which are typically single-family dwelling units. 
Homeowners acquire traditional mortgage loans to finance their purchase, often from 
banks partnered with the CLT program. 
 
• As a condition of the ground lease, homeowners are permitted to a limited amount of 
appreciation upon resale of the home. CLT resale formulas generally allow sellers to 
claim all of their principal equity and a percentage of price appreciation. In the event of 
depreciation, resale formulas typically enable homeowners to recover most, if not all, of 
their principal equity. 
 
• CLT membership is open to all individuals within a geographically defined service area, 
including non-CLT residents. The organization is governed by a board, which includes 
equal representation from leaseholders (i.e., homeowners on CLT land), non-leaseholders 
(i.e. non-CLT residents within the community), and representatives of the “public 
interest” (Institute for Community Economics 1982). 
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While all CLTs uphold the principles of shared equity homeownership, their approaches vary 
widely. They are located in rural and urban locations, acquiring land through strategic purchases, 
donations, and/or public sector grants. A 2011 survey by the National Community Land Trust 
Network (NCLTN) identified nearly 250 CLTs in 46 states, including more than 6,500 
affordable dwelling units (Thaden 2012). Their portfolios are predominantly comprised of 
owner-occupied, single-family homes, but also include alternate types of dwelling units (e.g. 
single-family attached units, multi-family buildings), tenure (e.g. owner and rental), and land 
uses (e.g. residential, commercial, agricultural, and open space). 
 
The CLT literature describes several benefits for individuals and communities alike. At the 
household-level, CLT homeowners appear to fare better than traditional low-income 
homeowners in terms of wealth accumulation, homeownership durability, and subsequent 
homeownership opportunities (Jacobus and Davis 2010; Temkin, Theodos, and Price 2010; 
Davis and Stokes 2009). Further, due to the ongoing stewardship of the CLT, homeowners are 
able to obtain lower risk mortgages than their low-income counterparts in the conventional 
market. 
 
From the perspective of the community at large, CLTs have proven to be sustainable. In the 
midst of the foreclosure crisis, a December 2008 study found “foreclosure rates among members 
of 80 housing trusts across the United States were 30 times lower than the national average” 
(Fireside 2010); a 2010 NCLTN study identified only 12 foreclosures among a national sample 
of 2,151 CLT homeowners in the fourth quarter of 2009 (Thaden 2010). In addition, due to 
permanent affordability controls, communities retain housing subsidies invested in CLT 
properties (Davis 2010b; Davis 2006). In other words, affordable CLT properties do not revert to 
market rate prices within 15 to 30 years, as many other affordable housing programs dictate; nor 
do the initial homeowners walk away with the affordable housing increment, as in the case of 
many affordable housing subsidies centered on forgivable loans or soft second mortgages. 
 
Despite the literature and practitioner experience that recommend CLTs, the model is not a silver 
bullet for low-income homeownership. As with other affordable housing strategies, CLT 
homeownership targets a particular audience. CLT portfolios primarily consist of owner-
occupied or rental units (Thaden 2012). While rental units provide stable, affordable housing for 
low-income families, they do not deliver any wealth building opportunity. Conversely, most 
resale restricted, owner-occupied homes require households to obtain mortgage financing; as 
with conventional homeownership, CLT programs typically exclude households who cannot 
satisfy lending requirements or are otherwise “unbankable.” 
 
Limited Equity Cooperatives 
 
LECs are a collective ownership structure—a co-op corporation owns the building(s) in its 
entirety, while individual households own a share in the corporation (Davis 2006; Saegert and 
Benitez 2005; Sazama and Willcox 1995). The household’s share secures exclusive rights to a 
dwelling unit, as well as a vote in democratic co-op governance. This arrangement differs from a 
condominium project, where a household owns its dwelling unit outright and shares ownership 
of common areas. 
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More than 1.2 million US households live in housing co-ops, including full, limited, and zero 
equity corporations (Davis 2006; Saegert and Benitez 2005). A resale formula separates LECs 
from full equity co-ops; similar to CLTs, LECs limit an owner’s appreciation when they sell their 
co-op share back to the corporation (Davis 2006; Rohe 1995; Miceli, Sazama, and Sirmans 
1994). The National Association of Housing Cooperatives (NAHC) estimates more than one-
third of all housing co-ops, 425,000 households, are limited or zero-equity (National Association 
of Housing Cooperatives 2013). 
 
Since LECs are resident owned, there is no third-party profit and the building operates at-cost 
(Davis 2006; Sazama and Willcox 1995). In addition to an initial share purchase, shareholders 
pay monthly fees—similar to a mortgage or rent payment—to cover: building debt service, if 
applicable; operations and maintenance expenses, whether self-managed or contracted to a third 
party; and a building reserve fund dedicated to major repairs and emergencies. 
 
In many respects, LECs address the affordability constraint posed by CLTs. A collective, non-
speculative ownership structure enables lower entry thresholds for LECs (i.e. share prices) than 
conventional or CLT homeownership (i.e. down payments) (Davis 2006; Miceli, Sazama, and 
Sirmans 1994). Rather than qualifying for individual financing, LEC residents can pool resources 
and secure a blanket mortgage for the co-op corporation. This allows LECs to reach further down 
the affordability spectrum than CLTs. At the same time, the primary purpose of an LEC is not 
wealth building. An LEC typically enables a household to claim limited appreciation on the 
value of their share in the corporation, but monthly fees are excluded from their equity. In this 
way, the purchase of an LEC share serves as a very modest investment account, rather than a 
serious asset building tool. 
 
The principal argument for LECs is their ability to offer greater security of tenure and autonomy 
to low-income households (Miceli, Sazama, and Sirmans 1994; Saegert 2006). Many LEC 
projects grow out of tenant-led efforts to protest the loss of affordable rental units through 
threatened eviction, landlord abandonment, or foreclosure (Saegert 2006; Saegert and Benitez 
2005; Leavitt and Saegert 1990). The ability of households to organize against threats and, in the 
process, gain collective control over their housing represents a substantial benefit. In the process, 
LECs engender community and capacity building among typically marginalized households 
(Davis 2006; Saegert 2006; Leavitt and Saegert 1990).  
 
LECs can be difficult to sustain over time, however, due to their reliance on consensus-based 
governance and engagement (Saegert 2006; Rohe 1995; Sazama and Willcox 1995; Miceli, 
Sazama, and Sirmans 1994). LECs are active organisms, requiring significant shareholder 
commitment to make short- and long-term decisions (Rohe 1995). As initial LEC leaders move 
or pass away, it can be difficult to retain institutional knowledge and transition leadership 
(Leavitt and Saegert 1990). Self-governance also requires incoming shareholders to be aware of 
the rights and the responsibilities of cooperative ownership. The level and diversity of technical 
skill required for successful management can be difficult to foster during the early years of the 
LEC, much less sustain over the life of the project (Saegert and Benitez 2005; Rohe 1995; 
Sazama and Willcox 1995; Leavitt and Saegert 1990). 
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Project financing is another hurdle to the viability of LECs. The LEC structure enables 
shareholders to pool assets for a blanket mortgage, but it can still be difficult to find lenders 
willing to finance the acquisition of a collectively-owned building (Davis 2006). Further, since 
many LEC projects are formed in under-invested multi-family buildings, it can be challenging to 
access sufficient capital for major repairs and rehabilitation (Rohe 1995; Leavitt and Saegert 
1990).  
 
Lastly, although LECs fall under the shared equity umbrella, they do not inherently possess the 
same permanent affordability controls as CLTs (Davis 2006). This is due, in part, to the 
ownership structure. While CLT homeowners own their building(s), the CLT retains ownership 
of the land and enforces permanent affordability via the ground lease. In contrast, LECs 
generally own the land and building(s) together—there is no neutral “third party” to guarantee 
affordability over the long-term (Davis 2006; Miceli, Sazama, and Sirmans 1994). In a “cold” 
real estate market, when property values are decreasing and the building operation and 
maintenance costs are increasing, LECs often face financial challenges and risk losing their 
investment. Conversely, “hot” markets introduce temptation for low-income households; 
speculators are willing to pay substantially more for the building than original share prices and 
shareholders are enticed to cash out at market value. 
 
 
Discussion: CLT-LEC Hybrid Projects 
 
In summary, the literature suggests there are gaps between existing shared equity models that 
prevent programs from responding to the full spectrum of affordable housing need. The CLT 
model offers stability and support to low-income homeowners, but requires households to satisfy 
conventional lending criteria. Conversely, the LEC model can offer low- to very low-income 
households autonomy and very modest asset building opportunities, but shareholders often 
require fiscal and organizational support. Thus, this paper arrives at its central question: are 
emergent CLT-LEC projects able to fill the gaps left by CLTs or LECs alone? The remainder of 
this paper compares CLT-LEC partnerships located in: New York, NY (Cooper Square Mutual 
Housing Association); Burlington, VT (Champlain Housing Trust); Lopez Island, WA (Lopez 
CLT); and San Francisco, CA (San Francisco CLT and Northern California CLT).  
 
Starting a CLT-LEC Project: Importance of Social Feasibility 
 
In most instances, the LEC projects in the study evolved from distressed multi-family rental 
buildings—not unlike conventional LEC projects that do not engage a CLT. Residents initiated 
contact with the CLT in response to a housing crisis; the CLT represented a housing advocacy 
organization with the ability to help address a threat. In some instances, the residents directly 
petitioned the CLT to help establish an LEC from the outset; in others, the CLT worked with 
residents to evaluate their options and arrived at the LEC model. 
 
The motivations for considering conversion to an LEC varied, but the impetus was nearly always 
housing insecurity, including building foreclosure, eviction, or significant disinvestment by the 
landlord. For instance, in San Francisco CLT’s (SFCLT) Columbia United project, the LEC 
model allowed for the preservation of very low rents in a 21-unit building where residents were 
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fighting eviction and significant rent hikes. In a city where affordable housing is sparse, the CLT 
applied an LEC model to enable low-income, primarily immigrant households to protect a 
valuable housing asset. 
 
Alternately, Lopez CLT, located on Washington’s Lopez Island, began exploring affordable 
housing with local residents in a more conventional way, seeking to meet demand with a single-
family CLT model. However, few households qualified for individual mortgage financing, 
despite Lopez CLT’s efforts to significantly lower unit costs through sweat-equity construction 
and subsidies. A local banker provided an alternative, suggesting Lopez CLT initiate an LEC that 
negated household mortgages with blanket project financing. 
 
Champlain Housing Trust’s (CHT) experience with LECs diverged from the resident-initiated 
approach. Developed primarily in the 1980s and early 1990s, CHT and partner housing advocacy 
organizations implemented the LEC model in specific projects; theirs were the oldest LECs in 
the study. As a very early adopted of the CLT-LEC partnership, the majority of CHT’s co-ops 
were small rental properties (fewer than 10 units) in need of substantial investment. CHT 
purchased the properties, completed the rehabilitation, and helped interested residents form an 
LEC. In part, the choice to utilize the LEC model was driven by CHT’s emphasis on ownership 
at the time, as well as their partnership with the Champlain Valley Mutual Housing Federation 
(MHF). CHT supplied the buildings and worked with existing residents, but MHF provided a 
waiting list of interested residents to occupy LEC projects. 
 
In most of the LECs, the residents’ ability to organize and collectively petition the CLT for 
assistance was critical to the project’s success. While the strength (or weakness) of initial tenant 
organizing was not indicative of long-term capacity, CLTs believed the ability of residents to 
speak in a unified voice was important and facilitated the transition to collective ownership. 
Early commitment to self-governance contributed to the conceptual success of the LEC, as well 
as the CLT’s risk assessment. If the LEC’s governance breaks down and the corporation 
dissolves, the CLT would retain property ownership and, thus, be in a landlord position—a fiscal 
and organizational liability to the CLT. 
 
To mitigate this risk, most of the CLTs included social capacity in the project feasibility analysis. 
This assessment was especially crucial for smaller buildings, which require a higher degree of 
resident cooperation to sustain. SFCLT facilitated several early meetings to educate tenants 
about the LEC model and assess their willingness and capacity to participate in self-governance. 
Subsequently, SFCLT required a majority tenant interest to proceed with an LEC, including a 
signed memorandum of understanding (MOU) that outlined the rights and responsibilities of 
residents during the conversion process. As SFCLT explained, “we have them sign an [MOU] to 
explain that this is not traditional rental housing… We try to explain what that looks like, which 
is the challenging component… because it’s really hard to convert the psychology from moving 
from a renter to an owner if you’re living in the exact same unit.” 
 
Lopez CLT, the only organization with new-construction LECs in their portfolio, also required 
significant education for and commitment from potential residents early in the process. As newly 
constructed projects, residents were not part of a collective community before the LEC was 
formed. In order to foster commitment and community building, Lopez CLT required future 
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residents to participate in all stages of project development, from conception through design and 
construction. Resident commitment included a substantial sweat equity contribution, which 
strengthened community ownership and decreased construction costs. 
 
Conversely, Northern California CLT (NCLT) found it difficult to build residential commitment. 
NCLT received ownership of a rental property from another affordable housing organization; 
they did not, however, wish to be a landlord. Instead, NCLT envisioned working with existing 
tenants to build interest in an LEC, allowing residents to gain independence and minimizing the 
CLT’s direct involvement. Yet, NCLT was unable to manufacture resident interest and they’ve 
remained a landlord. This case further illustrates what the other CLTs have shown: a CLT plays 
an important role in the development and long-term stability of an LEC, as discussed in 
subsequent sections of this paper, but success of a co-op often relies on the residents themselves. 
 
Bricks and Mortar: Physical Features of CLT-LEC Projects 
 
Physically, the LECs in this study were diverse. While most LECs consisted of a single, mid-
sized multi-family building, there were a number of permutations created by local context and 
community needs. On Lopez Island, Lopez CLT’s LEC projects consist of newly constructed, 
single-family homes in clustered LEC neighborhoods—unique relative to all other LEC projects 
explored. Lopez Island is very rural with a limited supply of developable land and, thus, 
constrained affordable housing options. The environmental sensitivity and rural character of the 
area foster strict land use and development regulations to limit density. Given these conditions, 
as well as the preferences of potential LEC residents, Lopez CLT identified clustered, single-
family homes, simultaneously constructed on a single parcel, as the most appropriate physical 
form for their co-ops. 
 
In San Francisco, SFCLT and NCLT rehabilitated existing multi-family buildings, ranging from 
10 to 21 units, for their LECs. Before signing on to a project, the CLTs evaluated potential LECs 
to assess the amount of investment required to restore the building to an acceptable standard, 
defined as meeting both immediate and long-term needs of residents. The CLTs completed a 
financial feasibility analysis that weighed projected building acquisition and rehab costs against 
available housing subsidies, as well as target affordability levels for the project. SFCLT and 
NCLT also had LEC co-housing projects in their portfolios. While the co-housing projects—
buildings with individual sleeping quarters, but shared kitchen and common areas—were unique 
relative to other LECs in the study, they are a familiar housing vernacular for the Bay Area. 
 
The Cooper Square Mutual Housing Association (Cooper Square MHA) was the largest CLT-
LEC hybrid project in the study, consisting of 328 units in 21 scatter-site buildings on 
Manhattan’s Lower East Side. Originally part of the Cooper Square Urban Renewal Area in the 
1960s, the Cooper Square MHA buildings were city-owned until the 1990s. At that time, the 
MHA successfully argued that low-income co-ops often have difficulty managing their buildings 
over the long-term. Thus, the MHA proposed the city confer ownership to the organization; in 
turn, the MHA would convey the land to a newly formed CLT and convert the buildings into a 
scattered-site LEC. This arrangement allowed individual buildings to pool resources, achieving 
economies of scale for property management and maintenance. While the transition took several 
years to implement, residents began purchasing shares of the LEC in December 2012. 
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Dollars and Cents: Affordability Characteristics of CLT-LEC Projects 
 
When it came to affordability, all of the CLT-LEC projects in the study shared a common 
feature—their affordability realities exceeded their targets. In the majority of cases, the LECs set 
their income requirements to meet the needs of low-to-moderate income households. Maximum 
income requirements were generally capped between 80% and 120% of area median income 
(AMI). In reality, however, the LECs served households far below the maximum income; the 
average LEC household income fell between 50% and 60% of AMI, and, in the case of Cooper 
Square MHA in New York City, as low as 30% to 40% of AMI. 
 
Most of the LECs considered existing household assets in the eligibility requirements and 
mandated potential shareholders be a first time homeowner who would use the unit as their 
primary residence. The CLT-LEC projects also considered the ratio of monthly LEC fees to 
monthly shareholder income; qualified households could not dedicate more than 30% to 50% of 
income towards housing expenditures. Lastly, in many instances the CLTs obtained federal, 
state, and/or local subsidies for the acquisition and rehabilitation of the LEC project. These 
subsidies increased the affordability of the project, but also required set income restrictions, 
although the LEC shareholders often fell below the maximum income standards. 
 
At a granular level, the formula and price of LEC shares varied significantly across interviewed 
CLTs, as well as individual projects. Cooper Square MHA had the lowest share price at $500; 
the share prices for Lopez CLT projects varied between $2,000 and $3,000 plus a minimum 
sweat equity contribution during the construction phase; and SFCLT had the highest share price 
with a maximum of $15,000. These differences were rooted in the start-up costs for a project 
(e.g., building acquisition and rehabilitation costs), the amount of subsidy embedded in the LEC, 
and the affordability targets set by the CLT and LEC boards. Despite the variation, CLTs 
reported that households rarely required financing to join the LEC, which addresses the 
“bankability” problem for low-income households. In the event a qualified household required 
financial assistance to purchase a co-op share, it was generally handled by short-term lending 
support from the LEC shareholders themselves or a CLT internal revolving loan fund. 
 
Beyond the initial share price, LEC residents paid monthly fees to cover recurring expenses, such 
as building debt service (if applicable), property management expenses, utilities (if pro-rated 
across the building), taxes and applicable CLT ground lease fees. All CLTs required LECs to 
dedicate a portion of their monthly fees to a building reserve fund, used for long-term property 
expenses (e.g., roof replacement, new boiler) and emergencies. In each of the studied LECs, 
monthly fees were significantly lower than market rents in their respective cities, ranging from 
$350 to $1000 per month. CLTs determined per unit monthly expenses with a formula based on 
unit size (square footage), building age and repair needs, property management program (i.e., 
fully self-managed, partially self-managed, fully outsourced to a third party property 
management company), and desired reserve fund size. 
 
Lastly, LEC resale formulas sought to maintain the permanent affordability of shares—a critical 
component of shared equity models. The design and implementation of resale formulas varied 
between the CLTs, while remaining consistent across LECs within a CLT. In some cases, the 
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resale calculation was based on a fee-simple appreciation tied to the length of shareholder 
ownership; in others, the appreciation was contingent upon the consumer price index (CPI) or the 
change in AMI. While CLTs were divergent in their approach, all resale formulas permitted 
outgoing LEC shareholders to realize a modest return on their investment, while ensuring 
permanent affordability for incoming shareholders. The resale formula was applied to the initial 
share price paid by the household, plus any board-approved upgrades to the unit. 
 
Role of the CLT: Assessing Project Feasibility 
 
Previous sections explored the structure of LEC projects and their housing contribution to CLT 
portfolios. The interviews highlighted some ways LECs respond to inherent “weaknesses” in the 
CLT model, including addressing “bankability” challenges and extending ownership 
opportunities to lower income households. The remaining sections of the paper consider the role 
of the CLT, addressing how and what they lend to the LEC model. Further, these exploratory 
findings highlight the mutually beneficial aspects of the CLT-LEC hybrid project. 
 
The overarching role of the CLT in an LEC was to provide technical assistance and ongoing 
support. These contributions were particularly evident during project inception, as the physical 
and organizational aspects of the LEC took shape. CLTs characterized an LEC’s conceptual 
development and construction phases as lengthy; it can take as many as three years before an 
LEC is fully occupied and shares are available for purchase. An LEC’s project development and 
implementation phases also require a high level of capacity—financially, legally, and 
organizationally. Since projects often grew out of informal tenant organizations, the CLTs felt 
their technical support and expertise were critical to a successful LEC conversion. 
 
As small scale affordable housing developers in their own right, the CLTs were often better 
equipped to conduct feasibility analyses, calculating the physical and financial viability of the 
project and ensuring sufficient commitment to the LEC model. While the degree of 
professionalization varied, nearly all of the CLTs had specific feasibility tools designed to 
evaluate potential LECs. As self-organized tenant or housing advocacy groups approached the 
CLT with a project, they often conducted a three-point feasibility assessment of its physical, 
financial, and social attributes. 
 
CLTs believed on of their most important roles in early project development pertained to 
financing. The CLTs in the study were established non-profits with professional staff; they were 
also experienced developers, managing project budgets, obtaining financing, and securing 
subsidies to reduce costs. For LEC projects, the CLTs often leveraged their own resources to 
procure blanket financing on behalf of the LEC corporation. Owing to established relationships, 
CLTs were frequently in a position to educate lenders about LEC ownership structures and 
provide assurances about the project feasibility. The presence of the CLT as an experienced 
“back stop,” covering the LEC in the event of financial difficulty and buffering the bank, 
significantly improved the project’s economic viability. Subsequently, the CLT either transferred 
the blanket mortgage to the LEC upon sale of co-op shares or retained the mortgage and passed 
the debt service through as part of monthly LEC fees. 
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Despite the critical importance of financing in project development, CLTs reported that it fell 
within their organizational purview and, thus, was not considered a primary obstacle for an LEC 
project. As previously discussed, interviewees indicated that physical and financial assessments 
were only a part of the puzzle; social feasibility was the essential piece to a successful LEC. As 
one executive director phrased it: “Any developer can do the financial feasibility—it’s just 
running the numbers… Don’t underestimate the social feasibility.” Ultimately, cultivating strong 
shareholder commitment at inception was the most critical priority for the success of the project. 
 
Role of the CLT: Governance & Participation 
 
As conveyed in the literature review, a primary tenet of LECs is democratic, participatory 
governance. During interviews, CLTs emphasized their role in fostering autonomy within their 
LECs, characterizing the CLT as a technical resource and advisor. CLTs described their job as 
supporting LEC members, while allowing for a high degree of independence; the CLT was not—
and did not want to become—a landlord.  
 
CLTs primarily focused their efforts on providing administrative assistance (e.g., processing 
applications, verifying income qualifications), technical assistance (e.g., navigating co-op 
legislation, assisting with budget development), and training to LEC residents. Several CLT 
activities supported leadership development and resident education. In some instances, the CLT 
served as an advisor, particularly to the LEC governing board with respect to budgets and rent 
increases. The phrase “boards are frugal” repeatedly emerged from CLT interviews, referencing 
the tendency of boards to focus on the short-term benefits of low rents instead of the long-term 
financial health of the LEC. To that end, CLTs functioned as fiscal counselors for LEC boards, 
often preparing an initial draft of the budget and advising boards to see the long-term “forest” 
through the short-term “trees.” Lastly, due to their sustained involvement, CLTs provided an 
institutional memory for LECs, documenting the decision-making and investment history of the 
community. This was particularly valuable during leadership transitions between the original 
residents and more recent shareholders. 
 
While CLTs largely described themselves as supporting actors in LEC governance, they also 
cited their ability—and, sometimes, the necessity—to intervene in conflicts. In the event of 
internal disputes, the CLT served as a mediator, typically at the request of LEC residents; as a 
neutral party, the CLT attempted to help shareholders come to their own resolution. CLTs also 
reserved the right to intervene more directly when issues threatened the health of the overall 
project; this right was expressly documented in the CLT’s ground lease with the LEC. For 
instance, one LEC was in violation of a fire code. After several attempts by the fire marshal to 
resolve the issue with the LEC directly, the CLT intervened to ensure the problem was resolved 
and the building was brought into compliance. 
 
Role of the CLT: Stewardship 
 
Interviewees consistently characterized the CLT as an ongoing steward for LECs. CLT 
stewardship focused on three aspects of an LEC and was strongly rooted in the ethos of shared 
equity homeownership more generally. First, CLTs aspired to be social stewards, supporting and 
empowering LEC residents through good times and bad. As one interviewee described, LECs are 
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one of the best examples of “democracy in action” and the CLT’s purpose was to support that 
endeavor. CLTs expressed the need to facilitate social events for LEC shareholders and 
“celebrate the victories” as part of their stewardship responsibilities. LECs demand a consistently 
high degree of commitment and work from residents; in turn, CLTs felt it was important to call 
attention to an LEC’s community building efforts outside of shareholder’s day-to-day 
responsibilities. 
 
Second, CLTs viewed themselves as mission stewards, ensuring that LECs retained their 
permanent affordability controls and upheld co-op corporation by-laws. Through the CLT’s 
ground lease with an LEC, the project was insulated from market appreciation and shareholders 
were protected from sudden rent spikes or evictions. As the LEC experienced shareholder 
turnover, the CLT retained project subsidies on behalf of future residents. 
 
Third, CLTs positioned themselves as fiscal stewards, serving as silent financial partners and a 
“back stop” in order to leverage project subsidies and financing. Fiscal stewardship also meant 
that CLTs did not over-leverage themselves; the CLTs expressed a responsibility to themselves 
and their members to guarantee that LECs did not become a liability for the larger organization. 
To that end, CLTs engaged in careful evaluation of potential LEC projects, often choosing not to 
pursue a partnership with tenant groups or buildings that did not pass a feasibility analysis.  
 
Last, as a partner and property owner, CLTs executed ground or master leases that clearly 
outlined the rights and responsibilities of the LEC and CLT. The CLTs did not characterize 
themselves as unconditional cheerleaders for LEC projects. The CLT-LEC projects represented a 
business relationship and, as such, the legal responsibilities had to be well documented at project 
inception. As one interviewee stated, a CLT had to “maintain a culture of respect” with an LEC, 





The five case studies explored by this paper highlight an innovative means of extending the 
reach of shared equity homeownership. Driven by necessity, pragmatism, or both, each CLT 
adapted their organizational framework to accommodate co-op projects, while remaining true to 
their shared equity principles. The CLT-LEC partnerships responded to the individual financing 
and affordability challenges of CLTs, while providing the stewardship, technical assistance, and 
financial support that LECs require for long-term success.  
 
The universe of CLT-LEC hybrid projects, however, is very small and the scope of this study is 
limited to a handful of CLTs scattered across the country. As discussed previously, this can be 
partially attributed to the novelty associated with CLT and/or LEC models, as well as limited 
resources. However, each organization interviewed had more than one LEC in its portfolio and, 
with the exception of one CLT, none had converted an LEC back to a rental property. Future 
research should consider the scalability of CLT-LEC projects, both within a single CLT portfolio 
and in different markets across the country. 
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One lesson to draw from the case studies relates to the flexibility of the shared equity model. 
None of CLTs studied required extensive modification to incorporate LECs into their portfolios. 
The basic tenets of shared equity homeownership remained at the center of hybrid projects, 
minimizing the demand for additional expertise or changes to a CLT’s organizational mission. 
The cases suggest that, for existing CLTs, the emphasis is not on conceptualizing a new model of 
housing, but on developing a protocol for assessing the feasibility of potential LEC projects. This 
includes establishing a mechanism for determining the social feasibility of the LEC, recalling 
that CLT interviewees perceived resident-initiated projects to have the greatest chance of 
success. CLTs also emphasize the need to assess potential CLT-LEC partnerships from a 
financial perspective. The fiscal evaluation should flow in both directions, ensuring the LEC is 
capable of being financially independent from the CLT and confirming the CLT has sufficient 
resources to prevent the LEC from becoming a financial liability in tough times.  
 
The cases also highlight the importance of a formal partnership between a CLT and an LEC. 
This process includes navigating state legislation to establish the cooperative corporation, in 
addition to adopting an enforceable ground or master lease. As CLT interviewees intimated, the 
legal CLT-LEC framework further clarifies the relationship between the two parties and, in the 
worst-case scenario, facilitates the CLT intervening if the LEC project is ever at risk.  
 
This study provides a glimpse into a nascent form of shared equity homeownership. It illustrates 
how individual CLTs have innovated in response to demands for affordable, stable housing by 
incorporating an alternate form of shared equity homeownership into their portfolios. On a larger 
scale, these five case studies suggest a potential pathway to maximize the strengths of shared 
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